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ABSTRACT 
Amalgamation offers municipalities an incentive to free ride when they can subrogate 
the load onto the newly created municipality after amalgamation. However, the doubt 
about whether the merged municipalities were really selected at random remains, 
especially in the case of voluntary amalgamation. Moreover, the pre-merger 
municipality’s debt accumulation or public spending expansion before amalgamation 
cannot be confirmed as free-rider behavior because these municipalities might have 
only developed the infrastructure in preparation for the amalgamation. Based on the 
foregoing, this study divides pre-merger municipalities into two groups: those that had 
the chance to free ride when setting the long-term care insurance premium and those 
that did not. Moreover, it focuses on the revision of the long-term care insurance 
premium as the target of free-rider behavior. The regression results confirm that only 
pre-merger municipalities that formed amalgamation committees before FY2003 and 
approved amalgamation after FY2003 showed free-rider behavior. These municipalities 
revised the long-term care insurance premium lower than never-merged and 
pre-merger municipalities that formed amalgamation committees and approved 
amalgamation after FY2003. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Studies have recently applied the fiscal common-pool problem (i.e., the overuse of 
fiscal resources) first explored by Tullock (1959) and Buchanan and Tullock (1962) to the 
municipal amalgamation scenario. Amalgamation offers municipalities an incentive to 
accumulate public debt before the amalgamation takes place because the newly created 
post-amalgamation municipality subrogates the load. Hinnerich (2009) and Jordahl and 
Liang (2010), using a difference-in-difference (DD) estimation for Sweden to clarify 
municipalities’ free-rider behavior before amalgamation, found that smaller local 
governments tend to accumulate public debt in order to free ride on the increased 
number of taxpayers in the expanded municipal entity. On the contrary, Saarimaa and 
Tukiainen’s (2015) investigation in Finland pointed out that the pre-merger 
municipality’s free-rider incentive should be low under voluntary amalgamation 
because excessive free-rider behavior might exclude that participant from the 
amalgamation. Nakazawa (2016) also confirmed this hypothesis in the Japanese case.1 
These studies employ the DD method between pre-merger and never-merged 
municipalities. However, although they consider the parallel trend assumption of the 
public debt accumulation between the treatment group (pre-merger municipalities) and 
control group (never-merged municipalities) when applying this method, the doubt 
about whether the merged municipalities were really selected at random remains, 
particularly in the voluntary municipality amalgamation case compared with the 
compulsory case. To overcome this problem, in this study, I divide pre-merger 
municipalities into two groups based on the different timing of amalgamation: those 
that had the chance to free ride when setting the long-term care insurance (LTCI) 
premium burden for residents2 and those that did not. 
The latest program of municipality amalgamation in Japan ran from fiscal year (FY) 
1999 to FY2005.3  All municipalities that wanted to merge formed amalgamation 
committees to discuss and decide on the amalgamation process. The average interval 
between committee formation and amalgamation approval was about two years, 
although this differed by amalgamation. 
During this period, municipalities faced another institutional revision. In April 2003, 
all municipalities set their LTCI premium burdens for residents in order to balance the 
                                                  
1 Nakazawa (2016) also confirmed the extent to which central government regulation 
on issuing public debt affects free-rider behavior. 
2 The Japanese LTCI is administered at the municipal level over a three-year program 
management period based on the pay-as-you-go principle. 
3 The fiscal year in Japan runs from April 1 to March 31. 
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budget based on the forecast of the next period’s LTCI benefit. On amalgamation, the 
premium set beforehand carried over to the post-amalgamation municipality. Thus, 
some pre-merger municipalities had an incentive to free ride by setting the LTCI 
premium low because the LTCI benefit load of the next period would be borne by the 
larger entity after amalgamation. However, only pre-merger municipalities that formed 
amalgamation committees before FY2003 and approved amalgamation after FY2003 
had such an incentive to free ride. On the contrary, pre-merger municipalities that 
formed amalgamation committees and approved amalgamation after FY2003 did not 
have an incentive to free ride because the municipality had not scheduled its 
amalgamation when setting the LTCI premium. This first novelty of the present study 
allows us to compare the difference in free-rider incentives between pre-merger 
municipalities. 
The second novelty of the study focuses on setting the LTCI premium. The 
pre-merger municipality’s debt accumulation or public spending expansion before 
amalgamation cannot be considered to be free-rider behavior because these 
municipalities might have only carried out the infrastructure in preparation for the 
amalgamation. On the contrary, the setting of the LTCI premium was unrelated to the 
preparation for the amalgamation. Therefore, the present study is able to capture pure 
free-rider behavior before the amalgamation. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the 
institutional background of the Japanese LTCI system and municipality amalgamation 
in Japan. The empirical methodology is presented and data described in Section 3. 
Section 4 presents the estimation results and discusses the main findings. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2 Background 
2.1 Municipality amalgamation in Japan 
The ongoing process of municipality amalgamation in Japan can be roughly divided 
into three main waves. The first wave, from 1888 to 1889, reduced the number of 
municipalities from 71,314 to 15,820. The second wave lasted from 1953 to 1961, further 
reducing the number from 9,868 to 3,472. In the latest wave, between April 1999 and 
January 2012, the number almost halved from 3,229 to 1,719. 
The Japanese government enacted the Municipal Amalgamation Law in 1965 to 
promote amalgamation. This law included several measures to promote amalgamation 
such as guaranteeing the same inter-governmental subsidy to the merged municipality 
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for 10 years after amalgamation.4 However, although the law was revised every 10 
years until the 1990s, it did not provide for voluntary amalgamation, and the number of 
municipalities decreased by only 163 from 1965 to 1999. 
A remarkable change occurred in the latter half of the 1990s when the Japanese 
government reviewed the roles of the central, prefectural, and municipal governments. 
In 1999, the law was amended to conform to the provisions of the Omnibus Law of 
Decentralization, and additional measures were included to provide financial support 
for municipality amalgamation. Figure 1 shows the number of amalgamations from 
FY1999 to FY2011. Many municipalities pursued amalgamation only until the end of 
FY2005 because the financial support provided by the national government for 
amalgamation under the law was revised in FY2006. This explains why amalgamations 
peaked in FY2004 and FY2005. 
 
Fig. 1. Number of amalgamations. 
 
  
                                                  
4 Such a subsidy aims to adjust the uneven distribution between demand for basic local 
public services and tax revenue by local governments. 
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2.2 The LTCI system in Japan 
LTCI was introduced for the elderly in FY2000 to solve the long-term care problem in 
Japan. The insurers (municipalities) have established special LTCI accounts for a 
three-year program management period to administer the system. They estimate the 
total benefits for the next period and maintain a constant ratio of the total insurance 
benefits provided to the category I insured (aged 65 years and older). Therefore, the 
category I premium is linked to the benefit level. Surpluses, if any, are transferred to 
the Long-term Care Benefit Fund (LTCBF) against future deficits. When fiscal 
resources for a certain program management period are insufficient because of 
increasing benefits or decreasing revenue (owing to, for example, an error in the 
forecast increase in the number of eligible individuals or failure to set a premium), the 
municipality could draw down the LTCBF or borrow from the Fiscal Stabilization Fund 
(FSF). However, to repay the FSF loan, the municipality would need to increase the 
premium for the next program period. Moreover, using the general budget to fund the 
municipality’s LTCI special account is prohibited by law, beyond its entitlement of 
12.5% of the LTCI benefits.5 
Insured categories I and II (aged from 40 to 64 years old) can be grouped according to 
the nature of care required by the process of eligibility assessments. The conditions 
requiring care range from mild to serious in a multistep approach. The degree of 
eligibility ranges across six levels from “support need” (the lowest level) to “long-term 
care need V” (the highest level). Eligibility levels have been increased to seven since 
FY2006 with the division of the support need into two stages (support I and support II). 
Individuals eligible for support are not permitted to use some LTCI services (e.g., 
facility care services). The benefits are allocated on the basis of points and are limited 
by the degree of eligibility.6 The insured person should pay 10% of the care cost, while 
LTCI covers the remaining 90%. According to these institutional criteria, universal 
service use and horizontal equity compared with eligibility for LTCI benefits are 
guaranteed irrespective of the insured individual’s income and place of residence. 
 
2.3 Free-rider incentive for pre-merger municipalities 
The second program management period ran from FY2003 to FY2005. Before starting 
this period, municipalities had to forecast the period’s benefit and set the premium. 
Therefore, as described in Section 1, pre-merger municipalities that formed 
                                                  
5 The LTCI benefits are financed by premium revenue from the category I and II 
insured (50%), central government (25%), prefectural government (12.5%), and 
municipal government (12.5%). 
6 One point is equal to 10 to 10.5 JPY, depending on the region. 
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amalgamation committees before FY2003 and approved amalgamation after FY2003 
had an incentive to set lower LTCI premiums for the second period because the 
municipality could pass the benefit burden onto the new municipality after 
amalgamation. On the contrary, municipalities that formed amalgamation committees 
after FY2003 had no such incentive to free ride. Figure 2 illustrates the timeline of the 
Japanese municipality amalgamation program and LTCI premium revision.
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Fig. 2. Timeline of the municipality amalgamation and LTCI revision. 
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 I drop the municipalities that formed amalgamation committees before FY2000 and 
approved amalgamation before FY2003. Therefore, all municipalities employed in the 
study had no incentive to free ride before the first program management period (from 
FY2000 to FY2003). 
 
3 Empirical framework and data 
3.1 Empirical framework 
Weingast et al. (1981) considered the incentive to free ride in a formal framework. At 
the efficient spending level, the marginal social cost of a public spending project in a 
certain district equals the marginal social benefit. However, if the costs of the project 
must be shared among n  districts, only 1 ݊⁄  of the social marginal cost of the project 
should be loaded onto a district.7 Therefore, when municipalities amalgamate, a small 
municipality tends to have a strong incentive to free ride. Where iN  denotes the 
population of municipality i , which participates in an amalgamation, and jN  the 
total population of the post-amalgamation municipality, including municipality i , the 
social marginal borrowing cost of municipality i  is equal to 1ji NN . Hinnerich 
(2009) formulated the strength of municipality i ’s incentive to free ride as 
 1,01  jii NNFreeride . Jordahl and Liang (2010) employed the same concept, which 
they referred to as the “law of n1 .” 
By employing Hinnerich’s (2009) definition of the free-rider incentive associated with 
amalgamation and applying the case of setting the LTCI premium in Japan, one can 
define the following relation: 
 
,iii uFreeridepremium     (1) 
 
where iPremium  is the LTCI premium. The parameter   represents the free-rider 
effect and iu  represents the observed or unobserved premium determinants. By 
considering the difference in eq. (1), I can write the equation as 
 
,iii vFreeridePremium     (2) 
 
where   indicates the difference operator, representing the difference between the 
first and second program management periods. Since no municipalities in this analysis 
                                                  
7 Baqir (2002), Bradbury and Crain (2001), Bradbury and Stephenson (2003), and 
Gilligan and Matsusaka (1995, 2001) empirically analyzed the 1/n effect. 
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had an incentive to free ride before setting the first-stage LTCI premium, Freeride  of 
the first-stage LTCI premium is always zero. Because FreerideFreeride  , eq. (2) can 
thus be written as follows: 
 
,iii vFreeridePremium     (3) 
 
I employ the DD estimation for eq. (3). The control group is the never-merged 
municipalities. I divide the pre-merger municipalities into two treatment groups. Those 
that formed amalgamation committees before FY2003 and approved amalgamation 
after FY2003 are classified as Treatment_a and those that formed amalgamation 
committees and approved amalgamation after FY2003 are classified as Treatment_b. 
The other municipalities that formed amalgamation committees and approved 
amalgamation before FY2003 are dropped from the estimation. Therefore, parameter 
  of Treatment_a should be negative when the pre-merger municipalities showed 
free-rider behavior. On the contrary, parameter   of Treatment_b should not be 
significant because these pre-merger municipalities did not have the chance to free ride 
when setting their LTCI premium. I run the estimation by using the 
difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) method as follows; 
 
∆ܲݎ݁݉݅ݑ݉௜ ൌ ߠ ൅ ߚଵܨݎ݁݁ݎ݅݀݁௜ ൅ ߚଶܨݎ݁݁ݎ݅݀݁௜ ൈ ܶݎ݁ܽݐ݉݁݊ݐ_ܽ_݀ݑ݉݉ݕ௜ ൅ ݒ௜,  (4) 
 
I can therefore capture the free-rider incentive of pre-merger municipalities in 
Treatment_a from the total free-rider effect. 
 
3.2 Data 
The control group comprises 967 municipalities, while the treatment groups 
comprise 340 (Treatment_a) and 867 (Treatment_b) municipalities. From the above 
discussion, iPremium  is the difference between the premium of the first and second 
program management periods. Freeride , the key regressor of the study, represents the 
strength of the free-rider incentive of pre-merger municipalities. Under the LTCI 
system, the elderly bear the LTCI premium burden. Therefore, I change iN  and jN  
from the total population to the elderly population.  
I employ pre-control variables that might affect setting the LTCI premium. The 
eligibility ratio, namely the percentage of eligible elderly who could use LTCI services as 
a proportion of the whole elderly population, places pressure on raising the premium. 
Similarly, the elderly ratio, namely the percentage of the elderly population as a 
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proportion of the total population, also places pressure on raising the premium. 
Moreover, this is needed to control for the differences in the unit cost of LTCI services 
between municipalities. Therefore, I employ the average at-home and facility care cost 
per user. Finally, I use the LTCI premium of the first program management period. The 
pre-control variables are taken for FY2002, one FY before the second program 
management period. Table 1 describes the summary statistics and their sources. 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics. 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max 
LTCI premium (first period, JPY/month) 2174 2779 392.325 1533 4100 
Change in the LTCI premium (Control) 970 380.563 394.369 -825 1983 
Change in the LTCI premium (Treatment_a) 338 449.581 456.742 -1097 2067 
Change in the LTCI premium (Treatment_b) 866 455.909 433.504 -580 2368 
Freeride (including control group) 2174 0.390 0.399 0 0.995 
Freeride_a 338 0.749 0.214 0.016 0.995 
Freeride_b 866 0.687 0.268 0.020 0.991 
Elderly ratio (%) 2174 25.254 7.352 4.784 53.306 
Eligibility ratio (%) 2174 14.137 3.002 6.625 29.273 
At-home care cost (1,000 JPY/person) 2174 32.853 4.738 15.038 53.233 
Facility care cost (1,000 JPY/person) 2174 344.680 20.715 165.454 426.893 
Sources: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, the Annual Report on LTCI Programs 
2002 and 2003.  
 
The average, minimum, and maximum LTCI premium values of the first program 
management period are 2,780, 1,533, and 4,100, respectively. The highest elderly ratio 
and eligibility ratio for a municipality is approximately 53% for the total population and 
30% for the category I insured. 
 
4 Estimation results 
4.1 Parallel trend assumption 
We must test for the parallel trend assumption to justify using the DD method. 
Figure 3 shows the average LTCI premium of the first program management period of 
the control, Treatment_a, and Treatment_b municipalities. The LTCI premium of the 
first program management period was set before FY2000 when no municipalities in the 
sample had yet scheduled an amalgamation. Therefore, I employ the LTCI premium of 
the first program management period to compare the differences in each group. 
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Fig. 3. Average LTCI premiums of the first program management period (JPY/month). 
 
 
This figure shows a similar level between the control and treatment groups. Thus, I 
carry out a two-sample mean comparison test on the average premium for each group. 
Table 2 presents the results of the t-test. 
 
Table 2. Mean comparison t-test of the LTCI premiums. 
Control vs. Treatment_a Control vs. Treatment_b Treatment_a vs. Treatment_b 
Sample 967        338 967        867 338       867 
Average 2,802       2,775 2,802        2,757 2,775       2,757 
t-value 1.141 2.508** 0.763 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, 
respectively. 
 
The t-values for the control and Treatment_b municipalities are significantly 
different at the 5% level. Therefore, we must control for the difference in the LTCI 
premium. On the contrary, the t-test results between the control and Treatment_a 
municipalities and between the Treatment_a and Treatment_b municipalities support 
the homogeneity of municipalities before amalgamation starts. 
 
4.2 Baseline results 
2,803 2,775 2,756 
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
Control Treatment_a Treatment_b
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Table 3 presents the results of the baseline specification based on the DD and DDD 
methods. 
 
Table 3. The free-rider effect of smaller municipalities before amalgamation. 
Method DD DD DDD 
Group Control 
Treatment_a 
Control 
Treatment_b 
Control 
Treatment_a 
Treatment_b 
Freeride (total) 
 
Freeride_a 
 
Freeride_b 
 
 
-105.498***  
(32.071) 
 
 
 
 
-11.345 
 (23.700) 
-11.304 
(23.475) 
-79.435** 
(32.651) 
Elderly ratio 3.003*  
(1.675) 
2.468*  
(1.389) 
1.447 
(1.319) 
Eligibility ratio 93.418***  
(5.211) 
91.694***  
(4.242) 
91.339***  
(3.883) 
At-home cost 20.504*** 
(2.557) 
23.874*** 
(2.101) 
23.247***  
(2.051) 
Facility cost 1.829***  
(0.639) 
1.347*** 
 (0.520) 
1.637***  
(0.496) 
Premium  
(first period) 
-0.361***  
(0.036) 
-0.346***  
(0.030) 
-0.364***  
(0.028) 
Constant -1259.077***  
(243.947) 
-1213.770***  
(193.342) 
-1208.517***  
(186.770) 
N 1305 1832 2172 
R2 0.318 0.317 0.312 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, 
respectively. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
 
According to the results in Table 1, the average change in the LTCI premium from 
the first program management period to the second program management period for the 
treatment groups is higher than that for the control group, seemingly disputing the 
free-rider behavior of pre-merger municipalities. However, the regression results in 
Table 3 show that the parameter of the free-rider behavior of Treatment_a is 
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significantly negative in line with the hypothesis in this study. The point estimate is 
-105.498 and average Freeride  is 0.749. Therefore, pre-merger municipalities in 
Treatment_a revised their premiums downward by about 80 JPY per month (960 JPY 
per year) on average compared with never-merged ones. The free-rider effect on the 
change in premium is not large, however, with the average effect reaching about 21% of 
the average change in the LTCI premium of the control group. 
On the contrary, the regression results show that the parameter of the free-rider 
behavior of Treatment_b is not significant, again as expected. This result is different 
depending on whether pre-merger municipalities had the chance to free ride. Finally, 
the result of the DDD regression also supports the hypothesis. The parameter of the 
total free-rider incentive is not significant and the parameter of Treatment_a is 
significantly negative. 
These results suggest that smaller municipalities have an incentive to control the 
change in the LTCI premium before amalgamation. Owing to the free-rider incentive at 
amalgamation, smaller municipalities that have the chance of free-ride adopt 
opportunistic behavior by controlling the LTCI premium. On the contrary, smaller 
municipalities could not adopt such behavior if the chance to free ride did not exist. 
The pre-treatment control variables are significant in the LTCI system, except for the 
elderly ratio. The eligibility ratio, unit cost of at-home care, and unit cost of facility care 
all increase the LTCI premium. On the contrary, the high level of the LTCI premium of 
the first program management period induces a lower change in the premium of the 
second program management period. 
 
4.3 Robustness check 
As described in Table 1, the average change in the LTCI premium from the first to the 
second program management period of the treatment groups is higher than that of the 
control group. However, the regression results presented in Section 4.2 confirm the 
free-rider behavior of smaller pre-merger municipalities. These results imply that not 
all pre-merger municipalities in Treatment_a show free-rider behavior at 
amalgamation. 
From a geographical perspective, half of the municipality amalgamation decisions in 
Japan involve towns and villages in addition to cities. By contrast, amalgamations of 
multiple cities are rare (3% of all amalgamations). Usually, cities are more populous and 
financially richer than town and villages.8 When the amalgamation means the city 
absorbs the surrounding town and village, there would seem to be no incentive for the 
                                                  
8 Cities in Japan have 50,000 residents or more. 
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city to free ride at amalgamation. Figure 4 shows the pattern of municipality 
amalgamation by city, town, and village in Japan. 
 
Fig. 4. Municipality amalgamation by city, town, and village in Japan. 
 
 
Based on these geographical trends, I re-run the regression by dividing the sample 
into cities, towns, and villages. Table 4 shows the regression results. 
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283, 47%
Multiple Cities
Multiple Cities + Towns, Villages
One City + Multiple Towns and
Villages
One City + One Town or Village
Multiple Towns and Villages
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Table 4. Subsample regression results. 
Method DD DD DDD 
Group Control 
Treatment_a 
Control 
Treatment_b 
Control 
Treatment_a 
Treatment_b 
Subsample City Town and 
Village 
City Town and 
Village 
City Town and 
Village 
Freeride 
 (Total) 
Freeride_a 
 
Freeride_b 
 
 
-51.542  
(149.237) 
 
 
-121.000*** 
 (35.449) 
 
 
 
 
-44.280 
(63.865) 
 
 
 
 
-32.826 
(25.499) 
58.312 
(64.598) 
-106.657 
(153.282) 
-37.211 
(25.342) 
-77.361** 
(33.247) 
Elderly ratio -6.698*  
(3.703) 
3.217*  
(1.909) 
-4.424 
(3.190) 
2.060 
(1.609) 
-5.776* 
(3.196) 
1.070 
(1.481) 
Eligibility 
ratio 
119.745***  
(9.166) 
87.280***  
(5.787) 
117.155*** 
(6.991) 
87.124***  
(4.762) 
117.221*** 
(6.905) 
87.118*** 
(4.299) 
At-home cost 26.829*** 
(5.501) 
19.125*** 
(2.779) 
25.822*** 
(4.565) 
23.306***  
(2.297) 
27.815*** 
(4.608) 
22.362*** 
(2.216) 
Facility cost 4.864***  
(1.222) 
1.477** 
 (0.691) 
3.144*** 
(1.097) 
1.122*  
(0.580) 
3.665*** 
(1.144) 
1.425*** 
(0.546) 
Premium  
(first period) 
-0.452***  
(0.086) 
-0.349***  
(0.038) 
-0.432*** 
(0.067) 
-0.332***  
(0.033) 
-0.452*** 
(0.068) 
-0.353*** 
(0.030) 
Constant -2490.932***  
(421.224) 
-1029.479***  
(272.201) 
-1919.314*** 
(399.516) 
-1059.306*** 
(218.414) 
-2089.197*** 
(404.261) 
-1044.937*** 
(208.594) 
N 354 953 459 1375 499 1675 
R2 0.467 0.294 0.488 0.288 0.482 0.288 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, 
respectively. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
 
The results show that the parameter of the free-rider incentive of Treatment_a’s 
towns and villages is significantly negative, suggesting that pre-merger towns and 
villages that have the chance to free ride do so. On the contrary, the free-rider behavior 
of pre-merger towns and villages of Treatment_b municipalities could not be confirmed. 
Therefore, the results of the DDD regression also support the hypothesis. 
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5 Conclusion 
 
Amalgamation offers municipalities an incentive to free ride when they can 
subrogate the load onto the new municipality after amalgamation. Previous studies 
employ the DD regression between pre-merger and never-merged municipalities. 
Moreover, they focus on the difference in local public debt or local public expenditure. 
However, the doubt about whether the merged municipalities were really selected at 
random remains, especially in the case of voluntary amalgamation. Moreover, the 
pre-merger municipality’s debt accumulation or public spending expansion before 
amalgamation cannot be considered to be free-rider behavior because these 
municipalities might have only developed the infrastructure in preparation for the 
amalgamation. 
Based on the foregoing, this study divides pre-merger municipalities into those that 
had the chance to free ride and those that did not based on the timing of the LTCI 
premium revision in April 2003. Only pre-merger municipalities that formed 
amalgamation committees before FY2003 and approved amalgamation after FY2003 
had an incentive to free ride because they could set the premium low and the 
post-amalgamation municipality would subrogate the LTCI benefit. On the contrary, 
pre-merger municipalities that formed amalgamation committees and approved 
amalgamation after FY2003 had no such incentive to free ride because the municipality 
had not scheduled the amalgamation when setting the LTCI premium. In this way, the 
study can capture pure free-rider behavior before amalgamation because setting the 
LTCI premium is unrelated to preparing for amalgamation. 
The regression results based on the DD and DDD methods are clear: only pre-merger 
municipalities that formed amalgamation committees before FY2003 and approved 
amalgamation after FY2003 were confirmed as having showed free-rider behavior. 
These municipalities revised the LTCI premium lower than never-merged and 
pre-merger municipalities that formed amalgamation committees after FY2003 and 
approved amalgamation. Moreover, from the robustness check of the subsample 
regression, only towns and villages in pre-merger municipalities that formed 
amalgamation committees before FY2003 and approved amalgamation after FY2003 
showed free-rider behavior. Finally, the free-rider effect of the LTCI premium revision is 
about 21% of the average change in the LTCI premium of the control group. Overall, the 
results of this study confirm the free-rider behavior of pre-merger municipalities under 
voluntary amalgamation. 
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